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of his day in court. The rationale was simple; allowing a decree
to be entered on consent made the defendant a party to the re-
straining order, therefore, he had not made reasonable -effort
to prevent the interference.4 7
The fact which makes the defense fall is the consent decree.
It was indicated by Judge Fuld that there might possibly be a
different result had the injunction been issued otherwise. The
reasoning in the case should be examined in the light of the fact
that the defendant was faced with an anti-trust suit in which its
position was untenable. In order to save costs and time litiga-
tion was avoided by allowing the order to be issued against them
uncontested. Now, it finds it is faced with a suit on the very con-
tract it has been enjoined from performing. The corporation is
told, however, that it may still defend on the basis of-illegality in
order that the promisee will have an opportunity to try the
merits of the contract in court. Yet, even if the decision of this
court is rendered in favor of the plaintiff, the defendant would still
be lawfully enjoined from carrying out the terms of the contract.
Furthermore, the defense of illegality does not always present
the same relief as impossibility. The former leaves the parties
where the court found them and paid in consideration may not
be recouped." The latter allows for the recouping of considera-
tion paid in over that allocable to that part of the performance
which has been executed.4 9
Insurance Policy Interpretation
Two insurance policies beset the Court of Appeals this term
with problems of interpretation.
In Wag inan v. American Fidelity and Casualty Co.50 the
court specifically adopted the "complete operation doctrine"51
as a guide for construing problems involving "load and unload"
provisions52 of "use" clauses normally included in automobile lia-
47. "However willing defendants may have been to relinquish their own rights
under that contract, however ready to absolve themselves from liability, they certainly
had no authority or power to extguish Analine's claim. supra note 46 at 484, 113 N.
E. 2d at 847.
48. See Van Schaick v. Ma rhaltm; Say. Inst., 273 N. Y. 37, 6 N. E. 2d 88 (1936);
O'Mara v. Dentinger, 271 App. Div. 22, 62 N. Y. S. 2d 282 (4th Dep't 1946); REsTATn-
maENT, ConvAmcrs § 598.
49. 6 Wnmus, CoNrAcTs § 1974. (Rev. ed. 1938); REsTATEmNT, CoieRAcrs
§468; ESrATEtmET, REsT0=o §108 (c) (1937).
50. 304 N. Y. 490, 109 N. E. 2d 592 (1953).
51. E.g., see Note. 160 A. I- R. 1251 for a complete analysis of the doctrine.
52. A agrees to defend and indemnify G against claims for damages for acci-
dental injury or death arising out of the ownership maintenance or use of G's trucks.
The use of the rucks includes the loading and unloading thereof.
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bility policies issued to common carriers. The purpose of the
"load and unload" provision is to furnish coverage for injuries
arising beyond the actual "use" of the auto.53 The doctrine has
been approved of in New York" prior to the instant case and
adopted by most jurisdictions.55 It imparts a wider scope to
"load and unload" provisions by permitting recovery against
the insurer for all injuries which are closely connected in point
of time, place, or circumstance with the use of the vehicle in the
loading and unloading process." The doctrine is contrasted with
the narrower view which terminates liability for injuries result-
ing beyond the immediate process of placing the goods on the
trucL57
The Wagman case points out the breadth 8 of the "complete
operation doctrine." A carrier, insured by a policy containing a
"load and unload" provision, was engaged in picking up mer-
chandise from Bond's store. It was brought from the Bond's
store to the curb by Bond's employees and then loaded onto
the truck by the carrier's employees. The plaintiff, an employee
of Bond's, checked the merchandise as it was being put onto the
truck. In returning to the store to check other goods he injured
a pedestrian. This suit was brought for a declaratory judgment,
to determine whether the plaintiff should be protected under the
policy issued by the defendant to the carrier. The court con-
cluded that one of the plaintiff's activities was "supervising" the
loading process, and by adopting the broader doctrine of con-
struction found that the plaintiff was covered by the policy.
The lone dissenter, assuming an inclination in this Staie
toward the "complete operation" theory, would not allow recovery
on the basis that the plaintiff's acts were not related to getting the
goods out of the store and onto the truck. The "line of demarca-
tion must be drawn;" the plaintiff was merely checking inventory
53. 2 RicH~ws, INstRAxcE § 294 (1952) ; Gowan, Liability Insurance, Load-
ing and Unloading, 345 Ixs. L. J. 745-757 (1 Oct. 1951).
54. See Zurich Gen. Accident & Liability Ins. Co. v. Eagle, - Misc. , aff'd,
279 App. Div. 574, 107 IN. Y. S. 2d 552, motion for leave to appeal denied, 303 N. Y.
1016, 102 N. E. 2d 841 (1951) ; B. & D. Motor Lines v. Citizen Cas. Co. of N. Y., 181
Misc. 985, 43 N. Y. S. 2d 486 (1943), aff'd, 267 App. Div. 955, 48 N. Y. S. 2d 472
(1944); Krasilovsky Bros. Trucking Corp. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 54 N. Y. S. 2d 60
(N. Y. City Ct. 1945).
55. See note 51 supra for a complete listing of these cases.
56. Ibid.
57. Coming to Rest Doctrine: loading and unloading is deemed to be complete
when the actual removal or lifting the article or articles onto or off of the truck had
actually come to rest, or when every connection of the vehicle with the process of load-
ing or unloading had ceased. See note 51 supra.
58. One writer feels that "[T]he broad application of this theory might very
well cause insurers to endeavor to place some limitations upon the extention of such
clauses beyond what is reasonably contemplated in the writings of their policies." 27
N. Y. U. L. Q. Rv. 1059 (1952).
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.for his employer. This activity could have been carried on at a
time completely detached from the loading operation.
Although the "complete operation doctrine" extends the scope
of "load and unload" provisions there is still, apparently, some
necessity for a causal relationship to exist between the use of
the insured vehicle, as such, and the resulting accident.59 This
is indicated by the fact that the majority of the Court found
that at least a part of the plaintiff's activity was "supervising"
in loading of the truck.
Liability insurance such as "Owner, Landlord and Tenant's"
policies are drafted to limit risks of liability for injuries resulting
from the careless maintenance of buildings." They are extensively
written and may vary widely in their scope and terms. Often
times the insurer is confronted with a claim effectively testing
the draftsman's efficaciousness.
In Morgan v. Greater New York Tax. M. I. Ass'n.,61 the in-
surer issued an "O.L.&T." policy to co-partners individually.
The policy contained an exclusion clause for assaults "committed
by or at the direction of the Assured." One of the partners
(Leventhal), without direction or consent of his co-partner (Cron-
in), assaulted the plaintiff who subsequently won a judgment
against the partnership. The plaintiff brings this suit claiming the
non-participating partner's (Cronin) right of idemnification under
the policy.62 The insurer disclaims liability relying on the defini-
tion section which defines the word "Assured" as including the
named "assured" (Cronin) and also any partner of the named
"Assured." The insurer contends that the assault committed by
the "additional assured" (Leventhal) would thus exclude cover-
age to the named assured. The Court of Appeals reversed the
Appellate Division and held the defendant liable on the policy,
commenting that the true meaning of the definitions section was
to serve as an inducement to purchase insurance by affording
coverage to others, in addition to the applicant, without the
burden of added premiums. A construction that broadens the
scope of the exclusion clause and narrows the defendant's obliga-
tions distorts the true meaning of the section.6 3
59. See note 51 supra.
60. 1 RICHAmS, IxSURANCE § 17.
61. 305 N. Y. 243, 112 N. E. 2d 275 (1953).
62. INs. LAW § 109; "The rule is well settled that a creditor enforcing such apolicy, stands in the shoes of the insured, and forfeits the insurance if ther6 has beena breach of its conditions." Weatherwax v. Royal Indemnity Co., 250 N. Y. 281, 165
N. E. 293 (1929); Devitt v. Continental Casualty Co., 269 N. Y. 474, 199 N. E. 765
(1936).
63. Wenig v. Glens Falls Indemnity Co., 294 N. Y. 195, 201, 61 N. E. 2d 422, 445
(1945).
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Judge Dye dissented, and maintained that the plain words
of the policy excluded plaintiff from coverage because the judg-
ment was had against the partnership.
An insurer is liable only for those risks which it assumes in
the policy and they may limit their liability by the insertion of
any exclusion clauses which are thought proper. On the basis of
public policy insurers are usually excused from liability for crim-
inal acts of the insured whether or not they are explicitly exempted
in the agreement.8 6 But, contracts which indemnify an assured
for unlawful acts of his agents, and in which he was in no way
associated, are lawful.T
In finding that the exclusion clause was merely intended to
apply to the named assured, the court in the instant case in-
terpreted its meaning in the light of sound public policy. This
is the meaning an average policy holder of ordinary intelligence,
as well as the insurer, would attach to it.88
The Court of Appeals has thus made it clear to insurers that
even though there exist very little ambiguity they should spell
out explicitly the limits which they intend to place on their obli-
gations. The construction given under such circumstances will
be in favor of the assured since the insurer is the draftsman.
Statute of Frauds
The Statute of Frauds set about to remedy the abuse of oral
contracts and declared that certain agreements would be void un-
less some note or memorandum thereof is in writing and signed by
the party to be charged. 9 The purpose of the memo is to prevent
the enforcement of contracts that were never made.70
64. 6 COrOLy, BsiEss o-x INsuR. cE 5618 (2d ed. 1928); Devitt v. Continental
Casualty Co., 269 N. Y. 474, 109 N. E. 765 (1936); Ga!es v. Prudential Ins. Co. of
America, 240 App. Div. 444, 270 N. Y. Supp. 282 (4th Dep't), dppeal denied, 265 N. Y.
510, 193 N. E. 296 (1934).
65. "The purpose of the exclusion clause is to exclude certain risks or probabilities
of injury which the insurer considered too great to cover." Standard Surety and
Casualty Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 281 App. Div. 446, 119 N. Y. S. 2d 795 (4th
Dep't 1953).
66. "Liability insurance does not indemnify the insured for his own wanton as-
saults, or assaults committed by his agents if directed by him. There are two reasons
for this. Firstly, the injuries sustained by a person assaulted by the insured are not
accidentally suffered, but result from wilful conduct. Secondly, public policy forbids an
agreement indemnifying against wanton and criminal conduct." 1 RICHARDS, INSURMACE§ 17. -7. 1 RicriAns, I.xSURA cE § 17; Taxicab Motor Co. v. Pacific Coast Cas.
Co., 73 Wash. 631, 639, 132 P. 393, 396 (1913).
68. See Burr v. Commercial Traveler Mutual Accidcnt Assn., 295 N. Y. 294, 301,
67 N. E. 2d 248, 251, 166 A. L. R. 462 (1946).
69. PEns. PRop. LAw § 31.
70. 2 CoPmix, CoTRaAcTs § 498.
